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Case No. 200.80377-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Yohannes committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession or transfer of a 
financial transaction card set forth at Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3(1). The standard 
of review when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is: "[T]he 
evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A juiy conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820 
P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989)). This issue was preserved in a motion for directed verdict (R. 149: 145-46). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Kidus Yohannes appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Gary 
D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of unlawful acquisition, 
possession or transfer of a financial transaction card, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Kidus Yohannes was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District 
Court on June 19, 2007 with Unlawful Acquisition, Possession or Transfer of a Financial 
Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
506.3 (R. 12). On July 2, 2007 a petition for inquiry into Yohannes' competency was 
filed and granted by the trial court (R. 24-). After evaluation, Yohannes was found 
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competent to proceed (R. 36). A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Gary D. 
Stott on September 20, 2007 and Yohannes v/as bound over for trial on the charge upon a 
finding of probable cause (R. 42-41, 148). Yohannes was subsequently arraigned and 
pled "not guilty" (R. 55). 
On February 15, 2008 a jury trial was held with Judge Stott presiding (R. 111-09, 
149). At the close of the State's case, Yohannes motioned the trial court for a directed 
verdict because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Yohannes was in 
possession of the debit card with the intent to use it (R. 149: 145-46). The trial court 
denied the motion (R. 149: 148-49). After deliberation, the jury convicted Yohannes (R. 
109, 135, 149: 182). 
On March 27, 2008 Yohannes was sentenced to 36 months probation and 120 days 
in the Utah County Jail, with credit for 90 days previously served (R. 145-). 
Yohannes filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on April 21, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Officer Randy Crowther 
Orem City police detective, Randy Crowther, testified that on June 8, 2007 he 
searched a vehicle belonging to Kidus Yohannes pursuant to a search warrant (R. 149: 
91-92). The vehicle, a 1992 two-door hatchback Plymouth Laser, had been located by 
officers several blocks from Yohannes' residence at 1428 South 630 East in Orem; 
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specifically, the vehicle was found in front of a residence at 1910 South 446 East (R. 149: 
93, 94, 95). Crowfher testified that the vehicle was locked and the hatchback was closed 
(R. 149: 94). They gained access to the vehicle through the sunroof, which was covered 
with a cutout piece of a sun visor affixed by tape (R. 149: 94-95). 
During the search of the vehicle a debit card from First Interstate Bank in 
Wyoming with the name of Sam Westfahl was found sitting in the bottom of the glove 
box (R. 149: 96-97). At the time, Westfahl and Yohannes were roommates (R. 149: 96). 
Crowther testified that the investigatory basis for the vehicle search had nothing to do 
with credit cards; and that he had not been told any credit cards had been missing (R. 
149: 98). Crowther also testified that he wore gloves during the search so he wouldn't 
contaminate any of the evidence (R. 149: 100). 
Crowther did not know how long the vehicle had been there or who had driven it 
there (R. 149: 99). Crowther also did not know how long the debit card had been inside 
the glove box, or who put it there (R. 149: 101). 
Westfahl reported to Crowther that he had reported the debit card missing on June 
7, 2007 (R. 149: 102). Westfahl first mentioned the missing card to police on June 8, 
2007 during the execution of the search warrant on Westfahl and Yohannes' residence 
(R. 149: 102-03). He was informed by Westfahl that the card had not been used (R. 149: 
103). 
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B. Testimony of Officer Jay Fredrickson 
Jay Fredrickson is an Orem City police officer (R. 149: 104). On June 4, 2007 at 
about noon, he met with Kidus Yohannes at the police station (R. 149: 105). Yohannes 
had brought his computer to the station to report damage or vandalism that had been done 
to the computer. Yohannes was upset because that morning he had discovered that the 
power cord to the on/off switch on the inside of the computer had been cut (R. 149: 106, 
108, 110). Yohannes opened the computer and showed him the cut wires/damage (R. 
149: 110-11). A computer repair shop had informed Yohannes that the repair costs 
would be about $100 (R. 149: 106). 
Yohannes informed Fredrickson that he believed that computer had been damaged 
by Sam Westfahl, one of his roommates (R. 149: 106-08). Yohannes told him that he 
hadn't had any problems with his roommates, but they were the only ones with overnight 
access to his computer (R. 149: 108). Fredrickson attempted to contact Westfahl several 
(at least two) times by going to the residence without success (R. 149: 107, 109). 
C. Testimony of Sam Westfahl 
In June of 2007 Westfahl was living at 1428 South 680 East in Orem, a four 
bedroom house (R. 149: 112, 113). The home is owned by Javier Tomai, and his other 
roommates were Sam Bird and Kidus Yohannes (R. 149: 113). He shared a bedroom 
with Yohannes from May 1-June 8, 2007 (R. 149: 113). 
Westfahl testified that his relationship with Yohannes was "strained" (R. 149: 
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114). "It just seemed like we never connected, and it seemed like he was just really 
standoffish and not approachable" (R. 149: 114). Westfahl testified that he had no 
animosity towards Yohannes but thinks that "he probably had toward me" (R. 149: 114). 
Westfahl also testified that when he first met Yohannes, he believed that Yohannes did 
not act "normal" and that his behavior was "odd" (R. 149: 126). 
Westfahl verified ownership of the debit card introduced into evidence (R. 149: 
115). June 8, 2007 was a Friday (R. 149: 114). Westfahl testified to using the debit card 
"the previous weekend, and then Monday, Tuesday [June 4th and 5th] just noticed it 
wasn't there and [he] thought [he] had just lost it or misplaced it" in his room or in some 
clothing (R. 149: 115-16, 128). On June 7, 2007 Westfahl reported it missing to his bank 
(R. 149: 129). Later that evening he called the police from a Maverick store, and 
subsequently met with an officer about things that Yohannes] was doing that he felt were 
suspicious (R. 149: 130). At this time, however, Westfahl did not report to the police that 
his debit card was missing (R. 149: 130). He didn't mention the missing card to police 
until the next day when they came and searched Yohannes' portion of the bedroom and 
his car (R. 149: 130). He also did not contact the police to inform them that he had not 
damaged the computer (R. 149: 135). He testified that he "wasn't worried about it.... 
[And] figured if they wanted to contact [him] they would have found [him]" (R. 149: 
135). 
Westfahl normally kept the card on his person or in his top dresser drawer or 
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surrounding area (R. 149: 116). Westfahl used half the drawers in the bedroom and 
Yohannes used the other half (R. 149: 116). Westfahl had his clothes in the closet while 
Yohannes kept his in bags by his bed (R. 149: 116). 
Westfahl testified that Yohannes kept his computer upstairs in the living room, 
which was a common area in the house (R. 149: 118). Westfahl never used the computer 
(R. 149: 118). He testified that Yohannes was always on the computer—five to ten hours 
a day (R. 149: 119). Westfahl believed his internet activity was "suspicious" and raised 
"some red flags" (R. 149: 127). Specifically, Westfahl had concerns about the "type of 
websites he was looking at online, and then some of the clothes he would wear... from 
time to time" (R. 149: 127). 
On Monday night (June 4th) he was notified by Javier Tomai that Yohannes has 
accused him of vandalizing the computer (R. 149: 120, 134). Westfahl denied damaging 
the computer (R. 149: 120). On Tuesday morning (June 5th), Westfahl testified that 
Yohannes came upstairs, visibly upset, and accused him of taking the key to his car (R. 
149: 121). Yohannes was "enraged." He was "yelling, he was stomping, he was flailing 
hi arms. You know, it's just obviously very upset" (R. 149: 121). Westfahl and Tomai 
located the key in an open bag belonging to Yohannes on June 6th or 7th (R. 149: 122). 
That week Yohannes gave Westfahl the "silent treatment" and would glare at him with 
anger in his face (R. 149: 123). Tomai informed him that he had called a locksmith while 
the key was missing (R. 149: 132). 
7 
Westfahl testified he never gave Yohannes or anyone else permission to possess 
his debit card (R. 149: 1?4). Usually Yohannes parked his vehicle on the street or in the 
driveway (R. 149: 124). Westfahl denied ever riding in the vehicle of having access to it 
(R. 149: 125). 
The debit card was never used (R. 149: 136). 
D. Testimony of Kelvin Jasperson 
Kelvin Jasperson is employed at PC Club, a store that sells computer components 
and repairs computers (R. 149: 151). On June 4, 2007 he looked at a computer Yohannes 
had previously purchased from the shop (R. 149: 152). Yohannes informed him that a 
roommate or friend had damaged it and he wanted it repaired (R. 149: 152). He 
examined the computer and discovered that inside the unit some cables/wires had been 
cut (R. 149: 153). The cut was "clean" and were not the product of normal wear and tear 
(R. 149: 154). Jasperson had estimated the costs of the repairs to be $100 (R. 149: 154-
55). 
E. Stipulation 
The jury was given the following written stipulation: "The Utah State Crime Lab 
performed a finger-print analysis of the debit card in question. One fingerprint was 
located. It has been determined that it does not belong to the defendant. It is unknown 
whose print was found on the card" (Exhibit #3). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For Yohannes to be convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3, the 
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he: One, acquired a financial 
transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder; and two, that he did 
so with the intent to use it. However, in cases of circumstantial evidence, "[CJriminal 
convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before [this Court] 
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each 
element of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 404 (Utah 1980). Yohannes 
asserts that the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish 
either element of the crime for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANNOTATE § 76-6-506.3 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3(1) makes it a third degree felony to acquire "a 
financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the 
issuer, or with the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to 
use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2." In relation to Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
506.2, the jury was instructed that this section makes it unlawful for any person to 
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"knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or 
attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, by use of a stolen or fraudulently 
obtained financial transaction card" (R. 130 - Jury Instruction # 16C). See Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-506.2(1). In other words to be convicted the State had to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Yohannes: One, acquired a financial transaction card from 
another without the consent of the card holder; and two, that he did so with the intent to 
use it. Yohannes asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. 
On appeal, this Court must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict; and this court may reverse Yohannes5 conviction 
for "insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently mconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that [he] committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 11r4 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). 
The first element that State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt was that 
Yohannes acquired a financial transaction card belonging to Sam Westfahl without his 
consent. The evidence introduced at trial in regards to this element consisted of the 
following: 
Westfahl and Yohannes were roommates who shared a bedroom and whose 
relationship was at best "strained" (R. 149: 113, 114). Westfahl normally kept his debit 
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card on his person or in his top dresser drawer or surrounding area (R. 149: 116). On 
June 4th or 5th, Westfahl could not fmd the card and believed it to be lost or misplaced 
(R. 149: 115-16, 128). Westfahl did not give Yohannes or anyone else permission to 
possess his debit card (R. 149: 124). 
On June 4th, Yohannes filed a report of vandalism with the police relating to 
intentional damage to his computer that he believed was caused by Westfahl (R. 149: 
106-08, 110-11). Yohannes told the officer that he had not had any difficulties or 
problems with his roommates, but they were the only ones with overnight access to his 
computer (R. 149: 108). He told the technician at the repair shop that a roommate or 
friend must have caused the damage (R. 149: 152). That night, Westfahl was informed 
by another roommate that Yohannes had accused him of vandalizing the computer (R. 
149: 120, 134). 
On June 7th, Westfahl reported to his bank that the card was missing (R. 149: 129). 
Later that night, he called the police and subsequently met with an officer about 
suspicious behavior by Yohannes, however, he did not mention anything to the officer 
about the missing debit card (R. 149: 130). Westfahl found Yohannes' internet activity— 
the type of websites he was looking at—and some of the clothes he would wear to be 
suspicious (R. 149: 127). 
On June 8th, based upon Westfahl's report, police executed a search warrant on 
Yohannes' portion of the bedroom and his vehicle, which was parked several blocks from 
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the residence (R. 149: 91-92, 93-95). While the warrant was being executed, Westfahl 
mentioned to police that his debit card was missing (R. 149: 130). 
The police accessed the inside of the vehicle through the sunroof, which had a 
sunvisor taped to it to fill the hole (R. 149: 94-95). The debit card was found sitting in 
the bottom of the glove box in Yohannes' locked vehicle (R. 149: 94, 96-97). Yohannes 
was not present. His fingerprints were not found on the card, which was tested by the 
Utah State Crime Lab (Exhibit #3). The officer testified he did not know how long the 
vehicle had been located there, or who had driven it there (R. 149: 99). He also testified 
that he did not know how long the debit card had been inside the glove box, or who put it 
there (R. 149: 101). Westfahl denied ever riding in the vehicle or having access to it (R. 
149: 125). 
The debit card was never used (R. 149: 136). 
Because Yohannes was not present at the time the debit card was discovered in his 
vehicle, the State had to prove constructive possession (R. 149: 146-47). See Spanish 
Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, % 7, 975 P.2d 501. Constructive possession "occurs 
when 'there [i]s a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the [item] to permit a 
factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over 
the [item]." State in the Interest ofM.B., 2008 UT App 433, ^  21, 198 P.3d 1007 
(quoting State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911). "Stated differently, to show 
constructive possession, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [item] 
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w[as] subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to 
exercise that control." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at \ 16). "Knowledge and the 
ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make 
use of that knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, "[w]hether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [item] exists 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." Id See also, M.B., 2008 UT App 
433 at H 21; and Layman, 1999 UT 79 at If 14. 
In addition, the State has acknowledged that the evidence against Yohannes is 
circumstantial (R. 149: 147-48). "Although circumstantial evidence may be enough to 
prove constructive possession, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [Yohannes] committed each element of the crime charged." Bryan, 
1999 UT App 61 at 1f 10 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
Furthermore, "that burden requires a presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Id 
See also, State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983). 
Yohannes asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed or acquired Westfahl5s debit card. 
Westfahl5s debit card, which had been missing a few days, was found in Yohannes' 
vehicle. Yohannes and Westfahl did not get along. Yohannes had reported to police that 
he believed that Westfahl had intentionally damaged his computer. At approximately, the 
same time, Westfahl testified that his debit card disappeared or was misplaced. A few 
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days after Yohannes' report to police, Westfahl reported to police that he believed 
Yohannes was engaging in suspicious behavior. This resulted in the execution of a 
search warrant on Yohannes5 portion of the bedroom and on his vehicle. Yohannes' 
vehicle was found by police to be locked but accessible through the glassless sunroof. 
Yohannes' fingerprints were not found on the debit card. Westfahl testified that he had 
never ridden in the car or had access to it. Westfahl did not report the missing debit card 
to police during his initial report concerning Yohannes' behavior. He did not mention it 
until the following day when officers arrived to execute a search warrant. 
There was no evidence introduced that Yohannes made any incriminating 
statements about the debit card. See Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at f^ 9 (A factor weighing 
against conviction in a constructive possession case based on circumstantial evidence was 
that "defendant made no statements, incriminating or otherwise"). There was no evidence 
introduced that Yohannes and Westfahl were the only people with access to the bedroom, 
where Westfahl usually kept his debit card when it was not on his person. In fact, two 
other individuals resided at the residence. In addition, Westfahl did not testify as to the 
last known location of the debit card, only that he had used it over the weekend and that it 
was missing on Monday or Tuesday. Westfahl did not testify that Yohannes was aware 
that he had a debit card, or aware of where it was stored/placed when not on his person. 
Westfahl also did not testify to having other items taken from his possession or to any 
suspicious behavior by Yohannes in relation to theft. In addition, there was no evidence 
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that although the vehicle belonged to Yohannes, that he was the only person with access 
to it or access to the glove box. Even though the vehicle was locked when it was 
searched by police, they did not have a difficult time gaining access to the inside of the 
vehicle through the sunroof, which had the glass missing. 
Yohannes asserts that "the necessary nexus between [him] and the items seized 
does not exist... [and] that neither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for 
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ^ 10. The fact that the 
debit card was found in Yohannes' vehicle a few days after he had accused Westfahl of 
vandalism is insufficient for the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
constructively possessed/acquired the debit card. Instead this evidence presents only the 
possibility or perhaps even the probability that there was a nexus between Yohannes and 
the debit card. In truth, the evidence is nothing more than conjecture. 
Westfahl had an equal mistrust and motive to retaliate against Yohannes for 
accusing him of vandalizing the computer. It is certainly curious that Westfahl failed to 
report the missing debit card to police when he initially detailed Yohannes' suspicious 
behavior, but instead waited until the warrant was being executed. Moreover, while any 
number of persons could have vandalized the computer, a similar number of persons 
could have picked up the debit card and put it in Yohannes' vehicle. Yohannes' vehicle 
may have been found locked and away from the residence at the time the warrant was 
executed on June 8th. However, the police had no trouble accessing the inside of the 
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vehicle, and there was no evidence that Yohannes was the only one who drove or rode in 
the vehicle or even where the vehicle was located in the previous three to four days. 
Accord State v. George, 25 Utah 330, 481 P.2d 667 (1971) (Conviction for larceny 
reversed when there were other hypotheses inconsistent with larceny that could be 
constructed out of the tenuous facts which existed). 
To convict Yohannes under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3, the State also had 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he acquired or possessed the debit card "with 
intent to use it.55 Yohannes asserts that intent is a separate element of this offense. Cf 
State v. Nisonger, 2008 UT App 359 (Intent to use the weapon is not part of the 
possession offense of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person where 
"dangerous weapon" is defined as "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury"). Ordinarily intent may be established or inferred from acts, conduct or 
circumstances. See e.g. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980) (When intent is 
an element of the crime, its proof must rely on inference from surrounding 
circumstances). 
The State argued that Yohannes had a motive or intent to use the card because he 
had alleged that Westfahl had vandalized his computer and it was going to cost him $100 
to repair (R. 149: 148). However, this proposition is really nothing more than conjecture, 
or a mere possibility. "[N]either possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 792 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Accord State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). 
There was no evidence introduced that Yohannes attempted to pay for repairs with 
a debit card. He made no incriminating statements as to taking the card or intending to 
use it—or any statements about seeking retaliation against Westfahl. His fingerprints 
were not found on the card, and the debit card was not used while it was missing, nor was 
there evidence that any attempts at using the card were made. In relation to the damage 
done to his computer, Yohannes reported the incident to police. There was no evidence 
that he confronted Westfahl about the situation or that he demanded payment from 
Westfahl for the alleged damage. In addition, based on the State's reasoning, Westfahl 
had an equal motive for retaliating against Yohannes for reporting him to the police as to 
the damage done to the computer. 
Yohannes asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient for the State 
to meet its burden of establishing a quantum of evidence concerning the intent element 
from which the jury could have based its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Murphy, 617 P.2d at 404. Particularly when in constructive possession cases like this, the 
State's burden "requires a presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Bryan, 1999 UT 
App 61 at 1f 10. The only evidence produced by the State in relation to this element was 
conjecture or possibility, and therefore, it was insufficient to establish proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Workman, 852 P.2d at 985 ("When, as here, the evidence consists 
solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the role of the reviewing court is to 
17 
determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the 
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have 
a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is 
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
guilt"). 
This case is a constructive possession case based solely on circumstantial 
evidence. In such cases, "[C]riminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or 
probabilities and before [this Court] can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the 
jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 
P.2d 399, 404 (Utah 1980). Yohannes asserts that the circumstantial evidence introduced 
at trial was insufficient to establish either element of the crime for which he was 
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Yohannes asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession 
or transfer of a financial transaction card. 
DATED t h i s ^ a y of April, 2009. 
MARGARET P. LINDS 
Counsel for Appellant 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-506.2 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*H Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*!§Part5. Fraud 
-* § 76-6-506.2. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful use of card or automated banking de-
vice—False application for card 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to purchase goods, 
property, or services, by the use of a false, fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or fraudulently 
obtained financial transaction card, by any financial transaction card credit number, personal identification code, or 
by the use of a financial transaction card not authorized by the issuer or the card holder; 
(2) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to knowingly and willfully exceed the actual balance of a 
demand or time deposit account; 
(3) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed an authorized credit line by $500 or 
more, or by 50% of such line, whichever is greater; 
(4) willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into his or any other account by means of an automated banking device 
a false, fictitious, forged, altered, or counterfeit check, draft, money order, or any other similar document; 
(5) make application for a financial transaction card to an issuer, while knowingly making or causing to be made a 
false statement or report relative to his name, occupation, financial condition, assets, or to willfully and substantially 
undervalue or understate any indebtedness for the purposes of influencing the issuer to issue the financial transaction 
card; or 
(6) knowingly, with intent to defraud any authorized credit card merchant, card holder, or issuer, sell or attempt to 
sell credit card sales drafts to an authorized credit card merchant or any other person or organization, for any consid-
eration whether at a discount or otherwise, or present or cause to be presented to the issuer or an authorized credit 
card merchant, for payment or collection, any such credit card sales draft, if: 
(a) the draft is counterfeit or fictitious; 
(b) the purported sales evidenced by any such credit card sales draft did not take place; 
(c) the purported sale was not authorized by the card holder; 
(d) the items or services purported to be sold as evidenced by the credit card sales drafts are not delivered or ren-
dered to the card holder or person intended to receive them; or 
(e) when delivered or rendered, the goods or services are materially different or of materially lesser value or qual-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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ity than represented by the seller or his agent to the purchaser, or have substantial discrepancies from goods or 
services impliedly represented by the purchase price when compared with the actual goods or services delivered 
or rendered 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1983, c 96. § 3, Laws 199L c 60, § 4. Laws 2007. c 306. § 100. eff April 30. 2007 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c 306, redesignated former subsecs (6)(i) through (v) as subsecs (6)(a) through (e) 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*li Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*1 Part 5. Fraud 
-f § 76-6-506.3. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful acquisition, possession, or transfer of 
card 
Any person is guilty of a third degree felony who: 
(1) acquires a financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the issuer, or, with 
the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; 
(2) receives a financial transaction card with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; 
(3) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the knowledge that it will be used in viola-
tion of Section 76-6-506.2; 
(4)(a) acquires a financial transaction card that the person knows was lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as 
to the identity or address of the card holder; and 
(b)(i) retains possession with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; or 
(ii) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the knowledge that it will be used in vio-
lation of Section 76-6-506.2; or 
(5) possesses, sells, or transfers any information necessary for the use of a financial transaction card, including the 
credit number of the card, the expiration date of the card, or the personal identification code related to the card: 
(a)(i) without the consent of the card holder or the issuer; or 
(ii) with the knowledge that the information has been acquired without consent of the card holder or the issuer; 
and 
(b) with intent to use the information in violation of Section 76-6-506.2. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1983, c. 96, § 4; Laws 1997. c. 191. $ 2. eff. May 5. 1997; Laws 2003, c. 306. § L eff. Mav 5. 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 306, added subsec. (5). 
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